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We report two new phenomena of deontic reasoning: (1) For conditionals with
deontic content such as, “If the nurse cleaned up the blood then she must have
worn rubber gloves”, reasoners make more modus tollens inferences (from “she
did not wear rubber gloves” to “she did not clean up the blood”) compared to
conditionals with epistemic content. (2) For conditionals in the subjunctive mood
with deontic content, such as, “If the nurse had cleaned up the blood then she must
have had to wear rubber gloves”, reasoners make the same frequency of all
inferences as they do for conditionals in the indicative mood with deontic content.
In this regard, subjunctive deontics are different from subjunctive epistemic
conditionals: reasoners interpret subjunctive epistemic conditionals as counter-
factual and they make more negative inferences such as modus tollens from them.
The experiments show these two phenomena occur for deontic conditionals that
contain the modal auxiliary “must” and ones that do not. We discuss the results in
terms of the mental representations of deontic conditionals and of counterfactual
conditionals.
Most research on conditional inference has focused on conditionals in the
indicative mood about factual possibilities, e.g., “if the woman washed the dishes
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then she wore rubber gloves” (for a review see Evans, Newstead, & Byrne,
1993). But recent attention has focused on two major categories of non-indicative
conditionals: deontic conditionals that refer to permissions and obligations, e.g.,
“if the nurse cleaned up the blood then she must have worn rubber gloves” (e.g.,
Manktelow & Over, 1990), and subjunctive conditionals that refer to counter-
factual situations that were once possible but are so no longer, e.g., “if the car had
run out of petrol then it would have stalled” (Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Thompson &
Byrne, in press). Our aim in this paper is to examine conditionals that are both
deontic and subjunctive, e.g.,“If the nurse had cleaned up the blood then she must
have had to wear rubber gloves”.
Deontic subjunctives seem to be different from epistemic subjunctives.
Rephrasing an epistemic conditional, e.g., “if the woman washed the dishes then
she wore rubber gloves” using the subjunctive mood, e.g., “if the woman had
washed the dishes then she would have worn rubber gloves”, tends to make it
counterfactual (Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Thompson & Byrne, in press). Many
epistemic subjunctives communicate a situation that was once possible but is so
no longer. People understand that the factual possibilities conjectured in the
antecedent and consequent of the conditional are false, and in fact the woman did
not wash the dishes and she did not wear rubber gloves. But does rephrasing a
deontic conditional, “if the nurse cleaned up the blood then she must have worn
rubber gloves” using the subjunctive mood, “if the nurse had cleaned up the
blood then she must have had to wear rubber gloves” make it counterfactual? We
suggest not. The deontic subjunctive may convey that the factual possibility
conjectured in the antecedent of the conditional is false, and in fact the nurse did
not clean up the blood. But it does not convey that the deontic possibilities
conjectured in the consequent are false, and that in fact the nurse did not have to
wear rubber gloves; nor does it convey that the factual possibilities are false, and
that in fact she did not wear rubber gloves. We first report the results of two
experiments that corroborate this novel claim. We then suggest that shared
knowledge or context is essential for a deontic subjunctive to communicate that a
situation once was (or was not) permissible or obligatory and is so no longer, e.g.,
“if you had gone to school 50 years ago, you would have had to learn Latin”.
INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS
People readily make inferences from conditionals in the indicative mood. Most
people make the valid modus ponens (MP) inference, from “she washed the
dishes” to “she wore rubber gloves”. They have difficulty in making the valid
modus tollens (MT) inference, from “she did not wear rubber gloves” to “she did
not wash the dishes”. Instead they often say that nothing follows. The frequency
with which they make the affirmation of the consequent (AC) inference (from
“she wore rubber gloves” to “she washed the dishes”) and the denial of the
antecedent (DA) inference (from “she did not wash the dishes” to “she did not
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wear rubber gloves”) varies in different studies (Evans et al., 1993), although
AC tends to be made somewhat more than DA (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).
Why are some inferences easy and others hard? According to one view,
people understand a conditional in the indicative mood such as, “if the woman
washed the dishes then she wore rubber gloves”, by keeping in mind explicitly
just one true possibility:
washed gloves
 . . .
where “washed” represents “she washed the dishes”, and “gloves” represents
“she wore rubber gloves”, and separate models are represented on separate lines
in the diagram (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). People are aware that there are
alternative possibilities, and the three dots represent an implicit model, which
indicates that alternatives to the explicit model exist but they have not been
represented explicitly (Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992). The initial set
of models is economical because of the constraints of working memory. MP is
easy because it can be made from the initial set of models, but MT is more
difficult because “she did not wear rubber gloves” cannot be matched to the
information represented explicitly in the initial set of models. It requires the
models to be fleshed out to represent other true possibilities, e.g:
washed gloves
not-washed not-gloves
where “not” is a propositional-like tag to represent negation (Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991). The interpretation of conditionals is mediated by their content and
context (Byrne, Espino, & Santamaria, 1999; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).
The models may be fleshed out beyond this “biconditional” interpretation to
include a third possibility:
washed gloves
not-washed not-gloves
not-washed gloves
Regardless of the interpretation, the information from the minor premise “she did
not wear rubber gloves” leaves only the second model and the conclusion that
“she did not wash the dishes” can be made. MP requires a single explicit model to
be kept in mind, whereas MT requires more than one explicit model to be kept in
mind, and inferences that require multiple models are more difficult than those
that require a single model, as many studies have shown (Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991).
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COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS
Conditionals can refer to counterfactual possibilities as well as to factual
possibilities, that is, they can refer to situations that once were factual
possibilities, but that did not occur (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). People
can readily generate counterfactuals (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) and their
counterfactuals tend to focus on similar events, such as actions (Byrne &
McEleney, 2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), controllable events (Girotto,
Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991; McCloy & Byrne, 2000), the most recent event (Byrne,
Segura, Culhane, Tasso, & Berrocal, 2000; Miller & Gunesagerem, 1990), or the
first cause (Wells, Taylor, & Turtle, 1987; Segura, Fernandez-Berrocal, & Byrne,
2002). Counterfactuals are often phrased in the subjunctive mood and often refer
to a close alternative (e.g., Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker, 1968).
People may understand a counterfactual, such as, “if the woman had washed
the dishes then she would have worn rubber gloves” by keeping in mind two
possibilities from the outset: the conjecture, the woman washed the dishes and
she wore rubber gloves, and the presupposed facts, the woman did not wash the
dishes and she did not wear rubber gloves:
factual: not-washed not-gloves
counterfactual: washed gloves
. . .
The counterfactual requires reasoners to represent what is false, temporarily
supposed to be true, and they may tag their models to keep track of their
epistemic status, as indicated by the tags “factual” and “counterfactual” in the
diagram (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). When people are given a
counterfactual, their memory tends to be that they were given instead the facts
“she did not wash the dishes” and “she did not wear rubber gloves” (Fillenbaum,
1974). They judge that someone uttering the counterfactual means to imply these
facts (Thompson & Byrne, in press). They can more readily make the MT and
DA inferences that require access to the facts (Byrne & Tasso, 1999). For
example, given, “she did not wear rubber gloves”, reasoners do not have to flesh
out their models to make the MT inference, they can incorporate the information
directly into the initial set of models.
The subjunctive mood can act as a cue that the antecedent and consequent are
false, but mood is an imperfect cue; it is neither necessary (Dudman, 1988) nor
sufficient (Thompson & Byrne, in press). Content and context can help in the
interpretation of counterfactuality. People are more inclined to keep the facts in
mind for a causal counterfactual such as, “if the car had been out of petrol then it
would have stalled” than for a definitional counterfactual such as “if the animal
had been a robin then it would have been a bird” (Thompson & Byrne, in press).
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A subjunctive conditional such as, “if there had been deserters at Waterloo they
would have been shot” may be interpreted as a counterfactual in a context in
which it is clear that there were no deserters, but it may be interpreted as a
hypothetical conditional in a context in which the speaker and hearer do not know
whether there were deserters or not (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).
The subjunctive mood can also be used for “semi-factual” conditionals, such
as, “even if the woman had washed the dishes she still would have worn rubber
gloves” (McCloy & Byrne, 2002). People understand the semifactual by keeping
in mind the conjecture, she washed the dishes and wore rubber gloves, and
the facts, this time that she didn’t wash the dishes and yet she wore rubber
gloves:
factual: not-washed gloves
counterfactual: washed gloves
. . .
Semifactuals convey that their antecedents are false but their consequents true,
and access to these facts ensures that reasoners make fewer of the DA and AC
inferences from semifactuals (Moreno-Ríos, García-Madruga, & Byrne, 2002).
In fact, given the DA premise “she did not wash the dishes” they often conclude
“she wore gloves” (Moreno-Ríos et al., 2002).
DEONTIC CONDITIONALS
Conditionals can refer to what is permissible as well as to what is possible.
People reason well with deontic conditionals, e.g., “if the nurse cleans up blood
[it is obligatory that] she wears rubber gloves” (e.g., Manktelow & Over, 1990).
For example, in Wason’s selection task, participants are given four cards
corresponding to four instances, e.g., a nurse cleaning up blood, a nurse not
cleaning up blood, a nurse wearing rubber gloves, and a nurse not wearing rubber
gloves, and they correctly select the cards that test the rule, the “cleaning up
blood” card and the “not wearing gloves” card (e.g., Manktelow & Over, 1991).
 The antecedent of the deontic conditional refers to a factual possibility and
the consequent to a deontic possibility (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).
Knowledge of some deontic rules may ensure that reasoners know not only what
is permissible, but also what is not permissible, e.g., a nurse cleaning up blood
without wearing gloves (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Reasoners could use
their knowledge to construct fully explicit models of the true possibilities, e.g:
Factual possibilities: blood gloves :Deontic possibilities
not-blood gloves
not-blood not-gloves
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and their knowledge also provides the complement of these models:
Factual possibility: blood not-gloves :Deontic impossibility
In fact, they may construct an initial set of models of the following sort:
Factual possibilities: blood gloves :Deontic possibilities
. . .
Factual possibility: blood not-gloves :Deontic impossibility
They can use the complementary model to help them select the cards that can
violate the rule (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). The key principles underlying
the proposed representation are (a) reasoners represent true possibilities, e.g., the
nurse cleans blood and must wear gloves, but because of working memory
constraints, they do not represent all of the true possibilities in their initial
representation (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), and (b) semantic or pragmatic
modulation can lead reasoners to represent counterexamples directly, e.g., she
cleans up blood and does not wear gloves is not permissible (Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 2002). Knowledge can make a counterexample explicitly available (e.g.,
Griggs & Cox, 1983). Of course familiarity with the rule is not essential:
knowledge of the context or the linguistic expression (e.g., a modal auxilliary
such as “must”) can cue the need to represent what is impermissible for
unfamiliar plausible deontic rules (e.g., Girotto, Gilly, Blaye, & Light, 1989),
and even for abstract deontic rules (e.g., Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Girotto,
Mazzocco, & Cherubini, 1992). A deontic conditional unlike a factual con-
ditional is not false in the case in which the nurse cleaned up blood and did not
wear rubber gloves. The deontic conditional may still be true but the nurse
violated its obligation (see Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Of course, a deontic
conditional can be false in some circumstances, e.g., in a country where it is not
in fact obligatory for nurses to wear rubber gloves to clean up blood. In fact,
reasoners select different cards in a selection task that requires them to test
whether a deontic rule is obeyed or is in force (Girotto, Kemmelmeier, Sperber,
& Van der Henst, 2001).
Most research on deontic conditionals has been with the selection task, and
our aim is to provide a systematic comparison of the frequency with which adults
make the four conditional inferences from deontic contents (for an examination
of MP and DA, see Manktelow & Fairley, 2000). Our account leads to a novel set
of predictions about the relative frequencies of the four inferences from deontic
and epistemic conditionals:
Prediction 1: We expect that reasoners should make more MT inferences from
deontic conditionals, because they have access in their initial set of models to
what is not permissible. When they are told that the nurse is not wearing gloves,
they can match this information to the information in their models of the deontic
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impossibility, and they can infer that it is not permissible for her to clean up
blood. Our account implies that MT can be made in either of two ways. One way
is from the representation of the true possibilities, e.g., the possibility that the
nurse did not clean blood and did not wear gloves. When it is known that the
nurse did not wear gloves, it can be inferred that the nurse did not clean blood.
This route may be most common for MT from epistemic conditionals, and it
requires the models to be fleshed out to include this possibility explicitly. A
second route for MT is via the representation of what is impossible. The nurse
cleaning blood and not wearing gloves is represented as an impossibility. When it
is known that the nurse did not wear gloves, the impossibility of the nurse
cleaning blood can be inferred. This route is available for deontic conditionals
when what is impossible is represented explicitly from the outset. Hence we
predict that reasoners should make more MT inferences from deontic con-
ditionals because they can avail themselves of this second route.
Of course, these two routes are available for the other inferences, e.g., MP can
also be made in these two ways. But we do not predict any difference in modus
ponens inferences from deontic and epistemic conditionals, because both have
ready access to the “true possibilities” route to MP. They should make the same
amount of MP, and of AC, inferences because they have represented in their
initial set of models the affirmative possibility (the nurse cleans up blood and
wears gloves). We also expect that they should not make more of the DA
inferences: there is no direct match in the initial set of models to the information
“the nurse did not clean up the blood” and so the models must be fleshed out
further to incorporate this information, just as they must for an epistemic
conditional. In fact, given that with deontic conditionals reasoners already have
two models in mind, they may find it especially difficult to flesh out their models
to include a third model.
SUBJUNCTIVE DEONTIC CONDITIONALS
Deontic conditionals can be phrased not only in the indicative mood but also in
the subjunctive, e.g., “if the nurse had cleaned up the blood then she must have
had to wear rubber gloves”, and they can use a variety of modal auxiliaries, some
of which make the obligatory nature of the consequent explicit, “…she would
have had to have worn rubber gloves” or “she must have had to wear rubber
gloves”, and others which leave it implicit, e.g., “…she would have worn rubber
gloves”, or do not disambiguate between its deontic or epistemic status, e.g.,
“…she must have worn rubber gloves”. A subjunctive epistemic is usually
interpreted as counterfactual: the antecedent and consequent are false. But we
suggest that a subjunctive deontic, “if the nurse had cleaned up the blood then she
must have had to wear rubber gloves” does not convey counterfactuality: it may
convey that the antecedent is false, but not that the consequent is false; it does not
convey that the nurse did not have to wear rubber gloves, nor that she did not
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wear them. Accordingly, a subjunctive deontic may be represented in exactly the
same way as an indicative deontic, that is, with two explicit models cor-
responding to what is permissible and what is not permissible. Reasoners do not
construct a model from the outset corresponding to the presupposed facts (the
not-p and not-q possibility), as they do for a subjunctive epistemic. Our account
leads to a novel set of predictions about the relative frequencies of the four
inferences from indicative and subjunctive deontic conditionals:
Prediction 2: For deontic content we predict that people will make MT and
DA as often from a subjunctive as from an indicative conditional. In contrast, for
conditionals based on epistemic content, people are more readily able to make
MT and DA inferences from a subjunctive than an indicative conditional (Byrne
& Tasso, 1999). Recall that we predicted that the frequency of MT should be high
for an indicative deontic; we predict it should be equally high for a subjunctive
deontic, because we propose there is no difference in the representation of
indicative and subjunctive deontic conditionals. (Note that we do not make an
additive prediction: we do not expect any increase in MT to accrue for
subjunctive deontics over indicative deontics, because the subjunctive mood
does not confer any greater access to the not-p and not-q case for deontics as it
does for epistemics.) MT should be made more often from both the indicative and
subjunctive deontics than from the indicative epistemic; MT should be made as
often from both deontics as from the epistemic subjunctive.
Recall that we predicted the frequency of DA should be low for an indicative
deontic; we predict it should be equally low for a subjunctive deontic, because the
representations are the same. DA should be made no more often from the
indicative and subjunctive deontics than from the indicative epistemic; DA
should be made less often from both deontics (and the indicative epistemic) than
from the subjunctive epistemic. Our suggestions about the representation of
indicative and subjunctive deontic conditionals, lead us to believe that there
should be no differences for MP and AC.
EXPERIMENT 1
SUBJUNCTIVE DEONTIC AND
EPISTEMIC CONDITIONALS
We examined indicative deontic conditionals, e.g., “if he drove the car then he
fastened the seat belt”, and subjunctive deontics, e.g., “if he had driven the car
then he would have fastened the seat belt”, and we compared them to indicative
epistemic conditionals, e.g., “if Ana was in Coimbra then Joao was in Lisboa”,
and subjunctive epistemics, e.g., “if Ana had been in Coimbra then Joao would
have been in Lisboa”. The deontic content we used was based on familiar
regulations that currently apply for driving (see the Appendix), concerning
obligations to wear a seatbelt, to turn on headlights at night, to drive at certain
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speeds on the motorway, and not to drink alcohol and drive. We chose this
content because it concerned social and legal regulations that could be expected
to be very well known to our participants.
Method
Materials and design. The content of the conditionals was either epistemic
(people in places) or deontic (driving regulations) and they were phrased in either
the indicative or subjunctive mood (see the Appendix for the set of materials).
The materials were presented to the participants in their native Portuguese. The
experiment had one between-subjects factor, conditional type, either indicative
or subjunctive, and so there were two groups of participants. The two within-
subject factors were the content type, epistemic or deontic, and the four inference
types, modus ponens, modus tollens, denial of the antecedent, and affirmation of
the consequent. The design was thus a 2 by 2 by 4 mixed factorial, with repeated
measures on the second two factors. Each participant carried out 32 inferences,
four instances of each of the four inferences for each of the two contents. The
dependent variables were the conclusion selected, and the latency to choose the
conclusion.
Procedure. Participants carried out eight practice problems (two con-
ditionals based on shapes, with each of the four inferences) to familiarise them
with the presentation of materials in the SUPERLAB program on a PC. The 32
arguments were then presented in a different random order for each participant.
The participants pressed a key to see the conditional premise on screen, then they
pressed a key to see the second premise which joined the conditional on the
screen, and finally they pressed a key to see the selection of conclusions which
joined the premises on the screen. The conclusions were presented in the same
fixed order for all problems, e.g: (1) He fastened the seat belt, (2) He did not
fasten the seat belt, (3) He may or may not have fastened the seat belt.
Participants were told that there was no time limit, and they chose a conclusion
by pressing the number keys, 1, 2, or 3, corresponding to their conclusion choice.
The latency to choose the conclusion was the recorded time from the presentation
of the conclusion on screen, controlled by the participant’s key press, to the
selection of a response, also controlled by the participant’s key press.
Participants. The participants were 72 undergraduate students from
Lisbon’s Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada. The participants were 9
men and 63 women, with an average age of 19 (SD 2.73). They were assigned
at random to the two conditions, indicative (n = 34), and subjunctive
(n = 38).
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Results
The results corroborated both sets of predictions, as Table 1 shows. For
indicative conditionals, participants made more MT inferences from deontic than
epistemic content, 68% vs 46%, F(1, 70) = 11.88, p < .0000. There were no
reliable differences in the frequency of DA inferences, 51% vs 61%, F(1, 70) =
2.26, p < .14, MP inferences, 92% vs 88%, F(1, 70) = 0.98 p < .32, and AC
inferences, 68% vs 70%, F(1, 70) = 0.11, p < .74.
Second, there were no differences between subjunctive and indicative
conditionals for the deontic content for any of the inferences: MT, 74% vs 68%,
F(1, 70) = 0.64, p < .43; DA, 54% vs 51%, F(1, 70) = 0.97, p < .76; MP, 90% vs
92%, F(1, 70) = 0.31, p < .58; and AC, 53% vs 68%, although the latter was
marginal, F(1, 70) = 3.37, p < .07. Third, we replicated the higher frequency of
MT and DA for subjunctives with epistemic content. Participants made more
MT from the subjunctive than the indicative for epistemic content, 66% vs 46%,
F(1, 70) = 4.71, p < .03, and more DA, 78% vs 61%, although the latter was
marginal, F(1, 70) = 3.01, p < .09. There were no differences for MP, 95% vs
88%, F(1, 70) = 1.61, p < .21, and AC, 64% vs 70%, F(1, 70) = 0.42, p < .52).1
1These eight comparisons were computed by planned simple effects t-tests on the non-
significant three-way interaction, F(3, 210) = 0.72, p < .54 (see Winer, 1971, for the legitimacy of
such comparisons), on a 2 (factual, counterfactual) by 2 (epistemic, deontic) by 4 (MP, AC, DA,
MT) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors, on the endorsements of conclusions.
The ANOVA showed a main effect of inference, F(3, 210) = 28.98, p < .0000, but not of content or
conditional. Each of the three factors interacted, conditional and content, F(1, 70) = 5.37, p < .02,
conditional and inference, F(3, 210) = 3.89, p < .00, and content and inference, F(3, 210) = 12.94,
p < .0000.
TABLE 1
The percentages of endorsements of inferences for
indicative and subjunctive conditionals based on
epistemic and deontic content in Experiment 1
MP AC MT DA
Epistemic
Indicative 88 70 46 61
Subjunctive 95 64 66 78
Deontic
Indicative 92 68 68 51
Subjunctive 90 53 74 54
MP = modus ponens, AC = affirmation of the consequent,
MT = modus tollens, DA = denial of the antecedent.
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The relative frequency of MT for the four sorts of conditionals is as we
expected. Participants made equally high frequencies of MT for the subjunctive
and indicative deontics as we have seen (74% and 68%), and they made more MT
from the indicative deontic than epistemic (68% vs 46%). Participants made a
high frequency of MT from the subjunctive deontic and epistemic and so there
was no difference between them, 74% vs 66%, F(1, 70) = 1.34, p < .25. In other
words, as we predicted, all three (74%, 68%, and 66%) are higher than MT from
the indicative epistemic (46%). Participants made equally low frequencies of DA
for the indicative deontic and epistemic as we have seen (51% and 61%), and
they made more DA from the subjunctive than the indicative epistemic (78% vs
61%). Participants made a lower frequency of DA from the subjunctive deontic
than the subjunctive epistemic, 54% vs 78%, F(1, 70) = 15.51, p < .00. In other
words, as we predicted, all three (54%, 51%, and 61%) are lower than DA from
the subjunctive epistemic (78%). There were no reliable differences for the
subjunctive deontic and epistemic for MP or AC, although the latter was
marginal, F(1, 70) = 2.24 and 3.2, p < .14 and .08 respectively. These results
corroborate our suggestions about the representation of deontic conditionals in
terms of what is permissible and what is not permissible.
The latencies to endorse the conclusions show that participants took the same
length of time to make the MP, AC, and MT inferences, from subjunctives and
indicatives, for deontic and epistemic content, as Table 2 shows.2 The only
reliable difference was that they took less time to endorse the conclusion for DA
from subjunctives than indicatives, for both the epistemic, 8.3 vs 8.6, F(1, 37) =
4.59, p < .03, and deontic content, 8.2 vs 8.7, F(1, 37) = 4.55, p < .04.
The experiment reveals two new phenomena of deontic reasoning: First the
results show that reasoners make more MT inferences from deontic conditionals
than from epistemic conditionals. The result corroborates our suggestion that a
deontic conditional is represented in an initial set of models that makes explicit
what is permissible and what is not permissible. The nurse cleaning blood and not
wearing gloves is represented as an impossibility. When it is known that the
nurse did not wear gloves, the impossibility of the nurse cleaning blood can be
inferred. The results also show that reasoners make the same amount of MP, AC,
and DA inferences from deontic as from epistemic conditionals. They make the
same amount of MP and AC inferences because they have represented in their
initial set of models the affirmative possibility (the nurse cleans up blood and
wears gloves). For the DA inference, there is no direct match in the initial set of
2These eight comparisons were computed by simple effects t-tests on the non-significant three-
way interaction, F(3, 111) = 0.71, p < .55, in an ANOVA on the log-transformed latencies for
endorsements of conclusions. The ANOVA showed a main effect of content, F(1, 37) = 8.11,
p < .00, and inference, F(3, 111) = 4.72, p < .00, but not of conditional. Content and inference
interacted, F(3, 111) = 3.62, p < .02, but none of the other factors did.
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models to the information “the nurse did not clean up blood” for either sort of
conditional, and so the models must be fleshed out further to incorporate it (e.g.,
to represent that the nurse does not clean up blood and does not wear rubber
gloves) and so there is no difference between them. In fact, it may be especially
difficult to flesh out the models any further for the deontic conditional given that
reasoners must already keep two models in mind.
Second, the results show that reasoners make MT and DA as often from a
deontic subjunctive as from a deontic indicative. For subjunctive epistemics,
reasoners make more of the negative MT and DA inferences (Byrne & Tasso,
1999; Thompson & Byrne, in press). But for subjunctive deontics, they do not
(see also Byrne & Quelhas, 1999; Quelhas & Byrne, 2000). The result
corroborates our proposal that a subjunctive deontic is represented in the same
way as an indicative deontic, by an initial set of models that makes explicit what
is permissible and what is not permissible. A subjunctive deontic does not
convey the presupposition that its antecedent and consequent are false.
Could the results simply indicate that the participants interpreted the
conditionals differently, for example, understanding the deontic conditionals as
biconditionals and the epistemic ones as conditionals? The data rule out this
alternative explanation. The frequency of DA and AC, usually higher for
biconditionals than conditionals, is in fact the same from the indicative deontic
and epistemic (and even somewhat less from the deontic compared to the
epistemic, AC 68% and 70%; DA 51% and 61%).
In the first experiment we conveyed the deontic nature of the conditionals
without using explicit modals such as “must”, or “should”. In our next
experiment, we examine the influence of such modal auxiliaries, by comparing
inferences from deontic conditionals that contain “must” and those that do not. In
addition, we use a wider range of contents for the deontic conditionals. Our aim is
TABLE 2
The log-transformed latencies (ms) to endorse the
conclusions for indicative and subjunctive
conditionals based on epistemic and deontic
content in Experiment 1
MP AC MT DA
Epistemic
Indicative 8.372 8.154 8.443 8.598
Subjunctive 8.213 8.332 8.444 8.285
Deontic
Indicative 8.346 8.551 8.601 8.737
Subjunctive 8.130 7.883 8.555 8.205
MP = modus ponens, AC = affirmation of the consequent,
MT = modus tollens, DA = denial of the antecedent.
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to replicate and generalise our results to subjunctive deontics that contain explicit
modal auxiliaries.
EXPERIMENT 2
SUBJUNCTIVE DEONTIC CONDITIONALS
WITH MODALS
Our aim in the second experiment was to compare indicative and subjunctive
conditionals that rely on deontic content phrased with a modal auxiliary and
without a modal. We examined indicative deontics with an explicit modal, e.g.,
“If the nurse cleaned up the blood then she must have worn rubber gloves” and
subjunctive deontics with a modal, e.g., “If the nurse had cleaned up the blood
then she must have had to wear rubber gloves”. We compared them to indicative
deontics without an explicit modal, e.g., “If the nurse cleaned up the blood then
she wore rubber gloves”, and subjunctive deontics without a modal, e.g., “If the
nurse had cleaned up the blood then she would have worn rubber gloves”. The
deontic content we used was based on prudential obligations (Manktelow &
Over, 1990), such as obligations for nurses cleaning blood to wear rubber gloves,
for motorcycle riders to wear helmets, and for tourists going deep sea diving to
take a diving course (see the Appendix). We again included epistemic con-
ditionals based on people-in-places content as a control comparison.
We chose the modal auxillary “must”, because it is ambiguous between what
is possible and what is permissible, and so it represents a strong test of our
proposals about the representation of deontic content (if our predictions are
supported even for “must” then we can infer they would be likely to be supported
for the less ambiguous auxilliaries such as “should”). Our predictions are the
same as in the previous experiment: first, we predict that reasoners will make
more MT inferences from indicative deontic conditionals, either with or without
a modal, compared to epistemic, and they will make the same amount of MP and
AC and DA inferences; second we predict that reasoners will make MT and DA
as often from a subjunctive as from an indicative conditional for deontic content,
either with or without a modal.
Method
Materials and design. The conditionals were either indicative or
subjunctive, and their content was either epistemic, deontic with a modal, or
deontic with no modal (see the Appendix). There were six groups of participants:
The first between-subjects factor was the conditional type, indicative or
subjunctive, and the second between-subjects factor was the content type,
epistemic, modal deontic, and non-modal deontic. They all carried out the four
inference types, MP, AC, DA, MT, which was a within-subject factor. The
design was thus a 2 by 3 by 4 mixed factorial design, with repeated measures on
the last factor. The participants carried out three instances of each of the four
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inferences, and so each participant carried out 12 inferences. The dependent
variables were the conclusion selected, and the latency to choose the conclusion.
Procedure. Participants carried out four practice problems with a neutral
content to familiarise them with the presentation of the materials in the
SUPERLAB program on a PC. They then received the 12 arguments in a
different random order for each participant. The presentation was similar to the
previous experiment, and there was a break of 1.5 seconds between each
problem. Participants were told that there was no time limit, but that the time was
measured. They chose a conclusion by pressing the number keys, 1, 2, or 3.
Participants. The participants were 303 undergraduate students from
Lisbon’s Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada. The participants were 51
men and 252 women, with an average age of 19 (SD 3.96). They were assigned at
random to the conditions, indicative epistemic (n = 51), subjunctive epistemic
(n = 50), indicative modal deontic (n = 52), subjunctive modal deontic (n = 49),
indicative non-modal deontic (n = 52), and subjunctive non-modal deontic
(n = 49).
Results
The results corroborated both sets of predictions, as Table 3 shows. First, for
indicative conditionals, participants made more MT inferences from modal
deontic than epistemic content, 76% vs 61%, F(1, 297) = 4.75, p < .03, and
somewhat more from non-modal deontic than epistemic, 72% vs 61, F(1, 297) =
2.53, p < .11 although the difference is not significant. They did not make more
DA inferences from modal deontic compared to epistemic content, 51% vs 70%,
in fact reliably fewer, F(1, 297) = 6.62, p < .01, and they did not make more from
non-modal deontic compared to epistemic, 65% vs 70%, F(1, 297) = 0.42, p <
.52. There were no differences for MP or AC, as Table 3 shows. These results
replicate the first experiment’s results and extend them to deontic conditionals
with an explicit modal auxiliary.
Second, as we predicted, for modal deontics, there were no differences
between subjunctive and indicative conditionals for DA, 58% vs 51%, F(1, 297)
= 1.04, p < .30, and MT, 78% vs 76%, F(1, 297) = 0.08, p < .77, nor for MP, 87%
vs 85%, F(1, 297) = 0.057, p < .81 and AC, 52% vs 55%, F(1, 297) = 0.15, p <
.698. Likewise, for non-modal deontics there were no differences between
subjunctive and indicative conditionals for DA, 69% vs 65% F(1, 297) = 0.43,
p < .51, and MT, 80% vs 72%, F(1, 297) = 1.65, p < .198, nor for MP, 89% vs
91%, F(1, 297) = 0.16, p < .688, and AC, 71% vs 66%, F(1, 297) = 0.57, p < .44).
Third, we replicated the higher frequency of the negative inferences for
subjunctives compared to indicatives for epistemic content. Participants made
Untitled-4 17/04/2003, 12:3456
DEONTIC AND COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS 57
more DA from the subjunctive than the indicative conditionals, 83% vs 70%,
F(1, 297) = 3.59, p < .059; the difference for MT was small, however, 67% vs
61%, F(1, 297) = 0.63, p < .43. There were no differences for MP, 90% vs 87%,
F(1, 297) = 0.42, p < .52, and AC, 68% vs 62%, F(1, 297) = 0.86, p < .35.3
For subjunctive conditionals, participants made a high rate of MT from
subjunctive modal deontic (78%) and subjunctive non-modal deontic (80%),
even more than the high rate from the subjunctive epistemic, 67%, F(1, 297) =
2.68, p < .10 and F(1, 297) = 4.19, p < .04 respectively. In other words, as we
expected, the frequency of MT was lowest from the indicative epistemic (61%)
compared to the three subjunctives (78%, 80%, and 67%) and to the two
indicative deontic conditionals (76% and 72%). Participants made fewer DA
inferences from the subjunctive conditionals for the subjunctive modal deontic
(58%) and subjunctive non-modal deontic (69%) than from the subjunctive
epistemic, 83%, F(1, 297) = 11.47, p < .00 and F(1, 297) = 3.46, p < .06. In other
words, as we expected, the epistemic subjunctive (83%) was higher than the
other two subjunctives (58%, 69%) and the three indicatives (70%, 51%, 65%).
There were no systematic differences for MP or AC.
3We carried out these 12 planned simple effects t-tests on the non-significant three-way
interaction, F(6, 891) = 0.389, p < .88, shown by a 2 (factual, counterfactual) by 3 (epistemic,
modal deontic, non-modal deontic) by 4 (modus ponens, modus tollens, denial of the antecedent,
and affirmation of the consequent) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor on the
endorsements of conclusions. The ANOVA also showed significant main effects of type of content,
F(2, 297) = 3.314, p < .04, and type of inference, F(3, 891) = 51.07, p < .0000, and the latter two
factors interacted, F(6, 891) = 7.02, p < .0000. None of the other effects was reliable.
TABLE 3
The percentages of endorsements of inferences for
indicative and subjunctive conditionals based on
epistemic, modal deontic, and non-modal
deontic content in Experiment 2
MP AC MT DA
Epistemic
Indicative 87 62 61 70
Subjunctive 90 68 67 83
Deontic modal
Indicative 85 55 76 51
Subjunctive 87 52 78 58
Deontic non-modal
Indicative 91 66 72 65
Subjunctive 89 71 80 69
MP = modus ponens, AC = affirmation of the consequent,
MT = modus tollens, DA = denial of the antecedent.
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Participants took the same amount of time to endorse the conclusion for each
of the four inferences from subjunctives and indicatives, for the epistemic, modal
deontic, and non-modal deontic conditionals, as Table 4 shows.4
The second experiment replicates the results of the first experiment and
extends them to deontic conditionals with and without an explicit modal. Once
again, the results corroborate our suggestion that deontic conditionals are
represented in an initial set of models that makes explicit what is permissible and
what is not permissible. The more explicit representation is constructed
regardless of whether or not the deontic conditional employs an explicit modal
auxilliary such as “must”, and the representation for deontic conditionals is
similar for indicative and subjunctive conditionals, both with a modal and
without.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Deontic conditionals are different from epistemic ones. People understand an
indicative epistemic by initially keeping in mind one explicit possibility, the
conjecture. But they understand an indicative deontic by initially keeping in mind
4These 12 comparisons were computed by simple effects t-tests on the non-significant three-
way interaction, F(6, 345) = 0.45, p < .85, in an ANOVA on the log-transformed latencies for
endorsements of conclusions. The ANOVA showed a main effect of conditional, F(1, 115) = 5.05,
p < .03, and inference, F(3, 345) = 2.74, p < .04, but not of content. None of the variables
interacted.
TABLE 4
The log transformed latencies (ms) to endorse the
conclusions for indicative and subjunctive conditionals
based on epistemic, modal deontic, and non-modal
deontic content in Experiment 2
MP AC MT DA
Epistemic
Indicative 9.317 9.394 9.423 9.285
Subjunctive 9.584 9.415 9.645 9.415
Deontic modal
Indicative 9.235 9.219 9.162 9.154
Subjunctive 9.595 9.657 9.547 9.223
Deontic non-modal
Indicative 9.221 9.374 9.214 9.133
Subjunctive 9.312 9.590 9.545 9.161
MP = modus ponens, AC = affirmation of the consequent, MT =
modus tollens, DA = denial of the antecedent.
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two explicit possibilities, the conjecture, and the possibility ruled out by the
conditional, e.g., “if the nurse cleaned up the blood then she must have worn
rubber gloves”:
Factual possibilities: blood gloves :Deontic possibilities
. . .
Factual possibility: blood not-gloves :Deontic impossibility
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). As a result, reasoners make more of the MT
inference from conditionals that contain deontic content compared to epistemic
content, but not more of the other three inferences, as our first experiment
showed, and they do so whether or not the conditionals contain a modal auxiliary
“must”, as the second experiment showed.
Subjunctive deontic conditionals are also different from subjunctive epistemic
ones. People understand a subjunctive epistemic by initially keeping in mind two
explicit possibilities, the conjecture, and the presupposed facts. As a result they
make more of the negative inferences, MT and DA, which require access to the
presupposed facts, from a subjunctive than from an indicative (Byrne & Tasso,
1999). But they understand a subjunctive deontic in exactly the same way as an
indicative deontic, by initially keeping in mind two explicit possibilities, the
conjecture and the possibility ruled out by the conditional. As a result, reasoners
make MT and DA as often from a subjunctive deontic as from an indicative
deontic, as the first experiment showed, and they do so whether or not the deontic
conditional contains a modal auxillary “must”, as the second experiment showed.
In summary, we corroborated two sets of predictions in the two experiments:
(1) Reasoners make more MT inferences from deontic conditionals. They do not
make more MP and AC and DA inferences.
(2) Reasoners make MT and DA as often from a subjunctive as from an
indicative conditional for deontic content (as well as the same amount of MP
and AC).
In this study we have provided a first attempt to understand conditionals that are
both deontic and subjunctive, and our conclusion is that people may understand
subjunctive deontic conditionals in a very similar way to indicative deontic
conditionals.
Our predictions were derived from our view that reasoners construct models
of possibilities (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 2002). An alternative view of
conditional reasoning is that people rely on rules of inference and construct
mental derivations of conclusions akin to logical proofs (e.g., Rips, 1994; Braine
& O’Brien, 1991); or they rely on stored rules of inference, which may be
contained within domain-specific schema dedicated to situations of permission
and obligation (e.g., Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Holyoak & Cheng, 1995), or they
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may be contained within an innate deontic reasoning module evolved for
violations of social contracts and hazard management (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992;
Fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2000; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992). However,
reasoning well need not depend on situations that elicit permission or precaution
rules, or “checking for cheaters” and “checking for endangerment” strategies, but
rather on situations that clarify relevant counterexamples (Girotto et al., 2001;
Liberman & Klar, 1996; Love & Kessler, 1995; Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995;
Sperber & Girotto, in press). We suggest that when people understand a deontic
conditional they keep in mind not only what is permitted but also what is not
permitted. Familiarity with the rule, or knowledge of its context and the linguistic
expression, such as “must” can help to ensure that what is impermissible is
readily available.
People use their knowledge to modulate the meaning of a conditional: content
and context can modulate the meaning of deontic conditionals to allow 10 distinct
interpretations of them, including conditional and biconditional interpretations,
tautological and reverse conditional (or enabling) interpretations, disabling
interpretations and so on (see Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, for details). When a
deontic conditional is interpreted as a biconditional, e.g., “if you tidy your room
then you may go out to play” (Manktelow & Over, 1991), there are two situations
that are not permissible, e.g., tidying the room and not being allowed out to play,
and not tidying the room and going out to play (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1992,
1995). People may keep both counterexamples in mind (Politzer & Nguyen-
Xuan, 1992) or just one or the other depending on whose perspective they take,
e.g., a mother or a child (Manktelow & Over, 1991;  Fairley, Manktelow, & Over,
1999; Light, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 1990).
In our experiments we examined deontic rules in the past tense. Deontic rules
in the present tense, e.g., “if the nurse cleans blood then she must wear rubber
gloves”, clearly refer to repeated events and generally can be rephrased using
“every time…”, although repetition is not an essential feature of them, e.g., “if
the world comes to an end, you must not panic” refers to a single unique event.
Deontic rules in the past tense, e.g., “if the nurse cleaned blood then she must
have worn rubber gloves”, seem to pinpoint a specific event. Uniqueness is not an
essential feature of them, however, e.g., the translation of “if a man dies, his wife
has to be buried with him” to the past tense, “if a man died in ancient times, his
wife had to be buried with him” retains its reference to repeated events.
Nonetheless, past tense deontic rules can seem inferential or forensic in nature;
the consequent can seem to report an inference that the speaker has made.
Although it has been shown that the frequency of inferences does not differ as a
function of past or present tense for indicative epistemic conditionals (Schaeken,
Schroyens, & Dieussaert, 2001), and for subjunctive epistemics (Byrne & Tasso,
1999), we do not yet know whether the frequency of inferences from deontic
conditionals differs as a function of tense and the question awaits future
research.
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We have shown that when deontic conditionals about common social rules are
phrased in the subjunctive mood, they are not interpreted as counterfactual,
unlike epistemic conditionals. Can subjunctive deontic conditionals be
counterfactual? We believe the answer is that they can, but their counterfactuality
depends on more than the subjunctive mood—in particular it depends on
knowledge of the content or context of the rule. Someone who utters a
subjunctive deontic such as, “if you had tossed heads, you would have had to
forfeit your winnings”, may mean one of two things. They may mean that the
facts are that you did not toss heads, but if you had, the rule that you forfeit your
winnings would have applied. The subjunctive mood in this case can convey a
presupposition that the antecedent is false (you did not toss heads) but it does not
convey the presupposition that the consequent is false, factually or deontically.
But a second meaning is possible if the speaker and hearer share knowledge, for
example, if the utterance is made in the context of a game whose rules have
changed. In that case, the subjunctive mood and the knowledge or context can
convey not only presuppositions about what once was possible and is so no
longer (tossing heads), but also presuppositions about what once was obligatory
but is so no longer (forfeiting). We suggest that counterfactual deontic
conditionals depend on more than linguistic mood.
Subjunctive deontic conditionals are an important and unique sort of con-
ditional which has not been examined before, despite the fact that people often
generate counterfactual thoughts that spontaneously focus on violations of social
regulations (e.g., McCloy & Byrne, 2000; N’gbala & Branscombe, 1995). This
first investigation of subjunctive deontics indicates that they can shed light on the
nature of reasoning with both deontic conditionals and counterfactual
conditionals.
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APPENDIX
The indicative versions of each conditional (with the subjunctive versions in parentheses).
English translations
Materials for Experiment 1
Epistemic
If Rute was (had been) in Coimbra then Cristina was (would have been) in Lisboa.
If Ana was (had been) in Porto then Joao was (would have been) in Braga.
If Pedro was (had been) in Faro then Rui was (would have been) in Beja.
If Alfonso was (had been) in Tavira then Leonor was (would have been) in Olhao.
Deontic
If he drove (had driven) the car then he (would have) fastened the seat belt.
If he drove (had driven) the car at night then he (would have) turned the headlights on.
If he drove (had driven) the car on the motorway then he drove (would have driven) at more than
40 km/h.
If he drove (had driven) the car then he (would have) drunk alcohol-free beer.
Materials for Experiment 2
Epistemic
If Rute was (had been) in Coimbra then Cristina was (would have been) in Lisboa.
If Ana was (had been)in Porto then Joao was (would have been) in Braga.
If Pedro was (had been)in Faro then Rui was (would have been) in Beja.
Deontic with modal
If the nurse (had) cleaned up the blood then she must have worn (must have had to wear) rubber
gloves.
If the courier (had) travelled by motorcycle then he must have worn (must have had to wear) a
helmet.
If the tourist went (had gone) deep sea diving then she must have taken (must have had to take) a
diving course.
Deontic without modal
If the nurse (had) cleaned up the blood then she wore (would have worn) rubber gloves.
If the courier (had) travelled by motorcycle then he wore (would have worn) a helmet.
If the tourist went (had gone) deep sea diving then she took (would have taken) a diving course.
Original Portuguese
Materials for Experiment 1
Epistemic
Se a Rute esteve (tivesse estado) em Coimbra, então a Cristina esteve (teria estado) em Lisboa.
Se a Ana esteve (tivesse estado) no Porto, então o João esteve (teria estado) em Braga.
Se o Pedro esteve (tivesse estado) em Faro, então o Rui esteve (teria estado) em Beja.
Se o Afonso esteve (tivesse estado) em Tavira, então a Leonor esteve (teria estado) em Olhão.
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Deontic
Se ele conduziu (tivesse conduzido) o carro, então usou (teria usado) o cinto de segurança.
Se ele conduziu (tivesse conduzido) o carro de noite, então ligou (teria ligado) os faróis.
Se ele conduziu (tivesse conduzido) o carro na auto-estrada, então circulou (teria circulado) a mais
de 40 Km/h.
Se ele conduziu (tivesse conduzido) o carro, então bebeu (teria bebido) cerveja sem alcool.
Materials for Experiment 2
Epistemic
Se a Rute esteve (tivesse estado) em Coimbra, então a Cristina esteve (teria estado) em Lisboa.
Se a Ana esteve (tivesse estado) no Porto, então o João esteve (teria estado) em Braga.
Se o Pedro esteve (tivesse estado) em Faro, então o Rui esteve (teria estado) em Beja.
Deontic with modal
Se a enfermeira limpou (tivesse limpo) o sangue, então teve de usar (teria de ter usado) luvas de
borracha.
Se o mensageiro viajou (tivesse viajado) de mota, então teve de usar (teria de ter usado) um
capacete.
Se a turista fez (tivesse feito) mergulho no mar, então teve de fazer (teria de ter feito) um curso de
mergulho.
Deontic without modal
Se a enfermeira limpou (tivesse limpo) o sangue, então usou (teria usado) luvas de borracha.
Se o mensageiro viajou (tivesse viajado) de mota, então usou (teria usado) um capacete.
Se a turista fez (tivesse feito) mergulho no mar, então fez (teria feito) um curso de mergulho.
Untitled-4 17/04/2003, 12:3465
66 QUELHAS AND BYRNE
Untitled-4 17/04/2003, 12:3466



